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LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE. By Adeline Gordon 
Levine. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co. 1982. Pp. xv, 263. 
Cloth, $24.95; paper, $14.95. 
"Love Canal" is now a household word and a symbol of the 
hazards of toxic waste disposal sites. The canal was originally exca-
vated in the 1890's as part of an unsuccessful scheme to divert the 
Niagara River for hydroelectric power. Between 1942 and 1953, 
Hooker Chemical Corporation filled the canal with 21,800 tons of 
waste chemicals, then sold the site to the Niagara Falls school board 
for one dollar with a deed containing a provision that relieved 
Hooker of liability for personal injury or property damage resulting 
from the presence of wastes. A school was built on the site and a 
residential neighborhood grew up surrounding the canal. Mean-
while, the drums of chemicals gradually corroded and their contents 
leached outward from the canal through the soil. In the late 1970's, 
following several years of heavy rainfall, the presence of the chemi-
cals became more apparent as sludge seeped into basements and 
emitted toxic fumes. In Love Canal· Science, Politics, and People, 
Adeline Gordon Levine, an associate professor of sociology at the 
State University of New York at Buffalo, provides an historical and 
sociological account of this man-made crisis, which eventually led to 
the relocation of more than 500 families under an emergency con-
gressional appropriation of $20 million. 
Levine chronicles the reluctant government response to what was 
at the time an atypical disaster1 of indefinite duration and uncertain 
extent, not covered by traditional emergency legislation. Her treat-
ment of the bureaucracy's role in the events at Love Canal, however, 
is mostly descriptive and lacks the depth of insight and analysis that 
she reserves for her portrayal of the angry reactions of local resi-
dents. Based on information collected in extensive interviews and 
through compilation of news accounts and the public record, Levine 
details the activities of the members of the Love Canal Homeowners 
Association, describing how they became organized, the awakening 
of their leaders, the development of their goals, and the steps they 
1. The potential for similar occurrences is revealed by estimates that there are more than 
32,000 waste disposal sites nationwide and that at least 1,200 currently present serious health 
and environmental hazards. Hazardous Waste: EPA, Justice Invoke Emergency Authority, 
Common Law in Litigation Campaign Against ./Jump Sites, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. 
INST.) 10,034 (1980). 
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took to achieve their objectives. This focus is at the same time the 
strength and weakness of the book. While Levine conveys a clear 
picture of why residents became disillusioned and frustrated with 
government officials, she gives little indication of the goals that moti-
vated those officials. Levine explains that she could not get the inf or-
mation she needed to analyze the government's reactions to Love 
Canal (p. 4). Nevertheless, her unbalanced approach leaves the 
reader without an appreciation of how or why the citizen-initiated 
political forces affected the bureaucracy. Thus, the reader cannot 
evaluate whether the strategies employed by the residents of Love 
Canal will be effective in dealing with future hazardous waste 
disasters. 
Levine also gives special attention to the role of scientists and 
scientific studies at Love Canal. She describes how the scientists 
conducted, communicated, interpreted and incorporated the studies 
into policy choices, and then demonstrates her thesis that science in 
this setting is social, that the scope of remedies available shapes the 
questions asked, and that the answers have profound consequences 
beyond any scientific meaning. A recurring theme is the intertwined 
effect of scientific uncertainty and the political importance of what 
little information was available on the extent of the contamination 
and the health effects on the residents. The timing and manner of 
the release of scientific studies became as important as their content. 
Results were repeatedly announced or leaked to the press before the 
individuals affected were notified, so that people received devastat-
ing news in an impersonal fashion, often without adequate explana-
tion. The first order from the Health Department is typical. On 
August 2, 1978, the commissioner made an announcement in Al-
bany, hundreds of miles from Love Canal, that the waste dump was 
a "great and imminent peril to the health of the general public resid-
ing at or near the site" (p. 7). He went on to recommend that preg-
nant women and children under two years of age who lived on the 
streets bordering the canal should temporarily relocate as soon as 
possible. There was no provision to pay for such an evacuation and 
no mention of why people living farther away were not included. 
The resulting fear and antagonism contributed greatly to the aliena-
tion of residents and officials and the deterioration of communica-
tion between them (p. 74). Residents became increasingly anxious to 
resolve the uncertainty of the risk to their health, while bureaucrats 
apparently wanted to avoid the hysteria following earlier announce-
ments and to delay until they had firm data before taking action. 
There has been much disagreement as to the validity of the scien-
tific studies conducted at Love Canal and the extent of the health 
dangers to residents beyond the area immediately abutting the canal. 
A prestigious panel formed by the Governor of New York concluded 
that " 'there has been no demonstration of acute health effects linked 
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to exposure to hazardous wastes at the Love Canal Site. 
[C]hronic effects of hazardous waste exposure ... have neither been 
established or [sic] ruled out yet, in a scientifically rigorous man-
ner.' "2 In response, Levine marshals the evidence for damaging ef-
fects as well as the considerable support that this data has received 
from the scientific community. A case can be made that the scientific 
certainty demanded by the panel is incompatible with some policy 
decisions, especially those concerning chronic exposure to chemicals 
with irreversible effects and unknown latency periods. By the time 
one is certain of the effect, it may have already occurred. In light of 
her extensive research, Levine could have considered how to counter 
the rigidity of scientific analysis with the flexibility of social and hu-
manitarian considerations, and the appropriate role of scientific par-
ticipation in public policymaking. Unfortunately, she sidesteps these 
broader issues and merely suggests that the blue-ribbon panel 
reached its conclusions because of conflicts of interest and political 
pressures (pp. 166-67).3 
Although Levine largely limited her analysis to a sociological ex-
amination of Love Canal residents, she has nonetheless produced a 
valuable case study. Many of the specific questions dealt with in her 
book, such as the habitability of the Canal neighborhood,4 remain 
unresolved, and government responses to the hazards from improper 
chemical disposal in other locations remain inadequate. The imple-
mentation of federal superfund legislation is still controversial and 
highly politicized. Even in more recent hazardous waste crises, such 
as the one at Times Beach, Missouri, government decisionmaking 
continues to ignore the valuable lessons that should have been 
learned from Love Canal and Levine's story.5 
2. P. 158 (quoting letter from Lewis Thomas to The Honorable Hugh L. Carey and Mem-
bers of the New York State Legislature (Oct. 8, 1980)). 
3. For a similar criticism of Levine's coverage of the role that science should play in poli-
cymaking, see Williams, Chemical Debacle (Book Review), 85 TECH. REv. 85 (1982). 
4. The EPA has reopened its evaluation of the extent of chemical contamination at Love 
Canal, postponing plans to resettle the area. Pedez, Love Canal Chemicals Leak; Resettlement 
l'/ans Set Back, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at Al, col. 1. 
5. "It is ... a story of the way institutions work, or fail to work, of bureaucratic inertia 
and buck-passing, and of scientific uncertainty in a realm where certainty always seems elu-
sive." Reinhold, Missouri Dioxin Cleanup: A Decade of Little Action, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 
1983, at 1, col. 2. 
